The Addict in Us All by Dill, Brendan & Holton, Richard
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PSYCHIATRY
HYPOTHESIS ANDTHEORY ARTICLE
published: 09 October 2014
doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2014.00139
The addict in us all
Brendan Dill 1* and Richard Holton2
1 Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA
2 Department of Philosophy, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
Edited by:
Hanna Pickard, University of Oxford,
UK
Reviewed by:
Serge H. Ahmed, CNRS, France
Bennett Foddy, University of Oxford,
UK
*Correspondence:
Brendan Dill , 77 Massachusetts
Avenue, 32-D808, Cambridge, MA
02139-4307, USA
e-mail: bdill@mit.edu
In this paper, we contend that the psychology of addiction is similar to the psychology of
ordinary, non-addictive temptation in important respects, and explore the ways in which
these parallels can illuminate both addiction and ordinary action. The incentive salience
account of addiction proposed by Robinson and Berridge (1–3) entails that addictive desires
are not in their nature different from many of the desires had by non-addicts; what is differ-
ent is rather the way that addictive desires are acquired, which in turn affects their strength.
We examine these “incentive salience” desires, both in addicts and non-addicts, contrast-
ing them with more cognitive desires. On this account, the self-control challenge faced by
addicted agents is not different in kind from that faced by non-addicted agents – though the
two may, of course, differ greatly in degree of difficulty. We explore a general model of self-
control for both the addict and the non-addict, stressing that self-control may be employed
at three different stages, and examining the ways in which it might be strengthened. This
helps elucidate a general model of intentional action.
Keywords: addiction, self-control, desire, incentive salience, ego depletion, mindfulness meditation, mental
contrasting, implementation intentions
INTRODUCTION
On a common conception, addicts and non-addicts are very dif-
ferent. Addicts’ compulsions drive them to act in ways that are
quite foreign to the non-addicted. They consume drugs in the full
knowledge that they are harmful, and in the face of a desire to stop,
something that the normal agent does not do.
We argue here that this picture is quite misleading. Non-addicts,
like addicts, have to contend with desires that are quite insensitive
to their reflective judgments about what is good. And addicts, like
non-addicts, have at their disposal a capacity for self-control that
can enable them to resist and overcome these desires.
The situation faced by the addicted agent is thus parallel to that
faced by the non-addicted agent. It is an extreme example of the
same kind of thing. Both will have desires that persist even in the
belief that their objects are worthless, or even actively harmful.
And so both will be faced with the self-control problem of resist-
ing these troublesome desires in the light of these beliefs. This
self-control challenge, faced by both addicted and non-addicted
agents, is the focus of this paper.
We begin by briefly outlining the empirical support for our
first claim, that addictive desires are instances of a kind of desire
common to all agents (see Desire). They result from a system –
the “incentive salience” system – that has evolved to create desires,
for foods and other things, that are independent from the agent’s
evaluations of the worth of those things. What is different in the
addict is not the intrinsic nature of these desires, but their origin.
Addictive drugs cause the desire-formation process to malfunc-
tion, with the result that they come to be desired with an intensity
and permanence that is quite out of proportion to any pleasure
they have given. However, the same problematic features of addic-
tive desires arise even when the incentive salience system does
not malfunction. We see this in more mundane desires such as
the craving for chocolate. We characterize the common features
of these “incentive salience” desires, and contrast them with the
more reasons-sensitive desires, which we call “cognitive desires,”
on the basis of which agents reflectively deliberate about what
to do. The competition between these two kinds of desire for
control over behavior poses the problem with which we are con-
cerned throughout the remainder of the paper: the problem of
self-control.
We begin our discussion of self-control by arguing that an
agent’s course of action is not solely determined by the relative
strengths of her desires; it also matters whether, and how, she exerts
self-control on behalf of some desires over others. Our argument
centers on two subject populations whose behaviors are, we think,
best explained as resulting from selective deficits in self-control
capacity: subjects with lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex (vmPFC), and subjects experiencing ego depletion (see The
Existence of Self-Control).
The picture that emerges from these first two sections portrays
intentional action as the result of a competition between two sys-
tems: the incentive salience system, which automatically guides
behavior on the basis of appetitive desires, and the self-control
system, by means of which an agent can, with effort, bring her
actions in accordance with her more reflective desires. Though
the conflict between these systems is typically more dramatic in
addicts, it pervades ordinary action as well.
Though we offer some new arguments in its support, this
two-system picture is far from novel. The basic outlines of the
approach date back to Plato [(4), Republic Book IV] and the more
contemporary version of this picture we present here has been
defended before (5–8). What we hope to add to this literature
is a more detailed picture of how these two systems interact to
produce behavior (see Three Stages of Self-Control). We propose
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that there are three distinct loci of self-control conflict – at the
point of deliberation, of formation of intention, and of execution
of action – which we call the deliberative, volitional, and imple-
mental stages of self-control. Distinguishing between these stages
brings into focus the nature of the self-control challenge faced
by addicts and non-addicted agents alike. Drawing on a large
body of empirical work, we articulate the nature of the conflict
between the self-control and incentive salience systems at each
stage, and suggest ways in which each kind of self-control might
be improved. What emerges is a single model of human motiva-
tional psychology that captures the predicaments of addiction and
ordinary temptation with equal aptitude.1
DESIRE
Let us start with the question of how we form desires. One might
think – many have thought – that we are hedonists at heart. On
such a view all of our desires stem from a fundamental intrinsic
desire for pleasure. When we desire things other than pleasure we
desire them instrumentally : that is, we desire them derivatively,
because we believe that they will give us pleasure.
Many have objected that such an account makes us seem far too
selfish: sometimes we want things because of the benefits that they
will bring other people, independently of any benefits they may
bring to us. We think that this point is probably right,2 but it is
not our primary concern here. Our argument is rather that such a
picture is wrong even when we consider such simple self-regarding
desires as those we have for different foods. Suppose that an agent
were to sample many different foods. Some they would like, others
not, and they would then go on to regulate their future desires
for them accordingly. We might expect these to be instrumental
desires, formed in the service of the desire for pleasure. But the
empirical evidence suggests not. It suggests instead that pleasure
typically causes us to have intrinsic desires for the foods them-
selves, which then motivate independently of any beliefs about the
pleasure that such foods will bring.
The crucial evidence for this is that our desires for different
foods are not always directly responsive to our explicit beliefs
about how pleasurable they are to eat. The desires do not need
such beliefs to bring them into existence; and they can persist
in their absence. We sometimes get a sense of this in our direct
experience – many of us experience a desire to eat more of a thing
(chocolates? over-rich desserts? peanuts? potato chips?) even when
we know that we won’t enjoy it and that it may leave us feeling
1We do not take our account to provide an exhaustive explanation of addiction (or
ordinary temptation, for that matter). It leaves out at least two important factors:
affect and social context. Affect comes into the explanation of addiction in two
places: first, one of the major reasons why addicts use is in order to relieve negative
emotions such as stress, anxiety, and depression (135); and second, these negative
emotions may significantly impair agents’ ability to exert self-control (136). And as
has been recognized since the earliest addiction treatment programs, social context
plays a huge role in addiction: social influence often explains why the addict started
taking the drug in the first place; and social support is an essential ingredient in
the process of recovery from addiction. Our account has little to say about these
important phenomena. Rather than attempting to survey all of the explanatory
factors in addiction, we aim only to characterize two of these factors – desire and
self-control – and the interactions between them. (Thanks to both Serge Ahmed
and Hanna Pickard for pointing out these limitations of our account).
2See Batson and Shaw (137) for a classic empirical argument for this claim.
somewhat nauseated. However, the best evidence for this phenom-
enon comes from studies, not of normal foods, but of addictive
drugs, and moreover, of how they work on rats. So let us start there,
and then return to the case of how more normal foods work on us.
Our account will follow the “incentive salience” theory developed
by Robinson and Berridge (1–3).3
Addictive drugs artificially increase the levels of the neurotrans-
mitter dopamine in the brain. Different drugs do this in different
ways: nicotine stimulates the production of dopamine directly,
opiates decrease the production of substances that inhibit the pro-
duction of dopamine, cocaine reduces the activity of the system
that reabsorbs dopamine after it has been released, and so on [(9),
pp. 245–246]. What is remarkable is that these various substances
with otherwise disparate biological and neurological effects have
this single common feature: they all boost the effect of dopamine.
It is reasonable to infer that this shared neurobiological quirk
must play a role in explaining these substances’ more obvious
common feature: that they all cause addiction. Although there
remains controversy here, this idea is borne out by the evidence.
By boosting dopamine levels, addictive drugs artificially stimulate
the mesolimbic dopamine system, which has long been known to
play an important role in motivation. That is, they stimulate it
directly, and not in the normal way via an experience that also
gives rise to pleasure. (Compare getting someone to see stars by
banging them on the head, rather than by showing them stars.) So
to understand how drug addiction works, we need to understand
what role dopamine plays in motivation.
For many years dopamine was thought to be a pleasure signal.
But it is not. Whilst it is typically accompanied by pleasure, that
is not what it is causing or registering [for a detailed defense of
this claim, see Ref. (10)]. Separate the indicators of a rat’s pleasure
(its facial movements) from the indicators of its desire (the effort
it will expend to attain the thing), and you find that dopamine
is linked to desire and not to pleasure. Artificially increase a rat’s
dopamine levels by giving it amphetamines, and it will work much
harder to get something even if that thing gives it no pleasure, and
it knows it (11). Reduce the rat’s dopamine levels via genetic mod-
ification and it will fail to work for a thing even if that thing will
give it great pleasure, and it knows it (12). Moreover – and this
is crucial given the implications for addiction – if you increase
the dopamine levels when a rat is sampling a foodstuff, what you
bring about is not just an immediate desire for that foodstuff, but
also a long-term dispositional desire for it (13). Show the rat the
foodstuff again later, and it will still want it strongly.
What is happening here? Rats are opportunistic creatures, who
need to be able to accommodate their tastes to a new environ-
ment. It makes sense for them to be able to regulate their desires
in proportion to the pleasure that they get from various food-
stuffs. Dopamine is clearly involved in this process. But it looks as
though dopamine works directly on desires, without the need for
the involvement of pleasure or beliefs about pleasure. It may be that
dopamine release is typically caused by pleasure: in the case of most
non-addictive foodstuffs, the most pleasurable ones will give the
greatest dopamine release. But if dopamine is artificially increased,
3The particular interpretation here follows that given in Holton and Berridge (9);
readers should look there for much more detail on what is here treated far too swiftly.
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as it is by addictive drugs, then this leads to the production of desire
independently of pleasure.
In fact, given what we have said, we need to identify two roles
that dopamine plays in the production of desire. One, the trigger-
ing role, involves the triggering of occurrent desire: dopamine has
a role in actually getting the rat to move toward the food in the
moment. The other, the formation role, involves the formation of
dispositional desire: dopamine works to set up a long-term dispo-
sition to want the food in the future.4 Stimulate a rat’s dopamine
levels at the same time that it is consuming a certain food, and it
will form a dispositional desire for that food (13). This is a focused
desire: it is focused on the food that was being consumed when the
dopamine was released. Present the food again, or present other
cues that were associated with it, and the rat will want it, even
if its dopamine levels are not then being stimulated. Dopamine
thus creates a dispositional desire that, when cued by the relevant
food or other associated cues, triggers an occurrent desire for that
food.
The formation role that dopamine plays has often been
described as a learning role. But that is misleading, since, at least
within the more cognitive models that now dominate psychology,
learning is best taken to involve a change in belief.5 It is not that
the rat comes to believe that the food is going to bring it some
advantage, and so forms an instrumental desire conditional on
that belief. Rather, what is happening is that an intrinsic long-
term desire for the substance is being created. If the desire is not
reinforced, it will fade in time. But with desires put in place by
addictive substances, this can take a very long time indeed – they
may last for much of a rat’s life.
On the basis of this evidence, Robinson and Berridge (1–3)
posited a motivational system, the “incentive salience” system,
which has the following features. The incentive salience system cre-
ates dispositional desires for objects on the basis of those objects’
past association with reward. These dispositional desires, which
we will call incentive salience desires, are activated – become occur-
rent – when the rat encounters the desired thing, or cues that have
been associated with it. Once an incentive salience desire is active,
it leads automatically to behavior in pursuit of the desired object.
Crucially, the neural reward signal on the basis of which the incen-
tive salience system acquires its desires is a dopamine signal. Thus
addictive substances, by artificially boosting dopamine levels in the
brain, produce a disproportionately large reward signal, which in
turn causes the formation of a disproportionately strong incentive
salience desire for the substance.
We have good reason to think this incentive salience system is
present in humans as well as rats. The argument for this claim
is an inference to the best explanation: the puzzling features of
human addiction are best explained by the hypothesis that addic-
tive desires are incentive salience desires. It explains the craving
4Holton and Berridge (9), in an attempt to avoid prejudicing the case, called these
“A-signals” and “B-signals.” We have replaced this terminology with something a
little more memorable.
5Although there remains some controversy here, it looks as though the formation of
beliefs can take place in the absence of dopamine (for instance, in genetically modi-
fied dopamine deficient mice) and hence in the absence of motivation. See Robinson
et al. (138); and for a recent discussion of the competing hypotheses together with
a proposal for compromise, see Berridge and O’Doherty (139).
that is typically prompted by cues associated with the drugs:
because of the artificial dopamine boost addictive drugs provide,
subjects who consume these drugs acquire a long-term intrinsic
desire for them, which is then triggered by the drug-associated
cues. This account explains relapse, even after withdrawal: for the
dispositional desire remains, ready to be triggered by the relevant
cues.6 Finally, in human subjects, the account explains why the
desires for drugs are so horribly independent from beliefs about
their worth. For the incentive salience system is working quite
independently of belief. The addict can know perfectly well that
continued consumption would destroy everything that they hold
dear. That does nothing to stop the rush of desire that is triggered
by the thought or sight of the drug, or, more broadly, of the people,
places or paraphernalia that have surrounded its consumption.
In addiction, the process whereby incentive salience desires are
acquired malfunctions. When the system is functioning normally,
the dopamine signal is proportional to the reward that the sub-
ject is experiencing, and thus the desire it produces is similarly
proportionate. When a subject consumes an addictive substance,
however, the artificial boost in dopamine that results can sever
this link between “wanting” and “liking, ” leading to a desire for
the substance that is way out of proportion with the pleasure it
brings.7
But of course, much of what we have said about the incentive
salience system still holds when it is not malfunctioning in this
way. When it works well it still lays down long-term dispositional
desires for things that have previously given pleasure; and these
desires will be triggered by the relevant cues. If the things fail to
give pleasure, then in time, the desire will diminish, though it will
not evaporate straightaway. And if the thing continues to give plea-
sure, then the desire will be reinforced, even if the agent comes to
believe that it is harmful.
To see this, consider the case of sugar. As far as we know, sugar
has no direct effect on the dopamine system: it does not imitate
dopamine, or inhibit re-uptake, or do any of the things that addic-
tive drugs do. Nevertheless, rats that have been exposed to a sugar
solution are strongly motivated to get it, just as they are motivated
to get addictive drugs. In fact, if they have a choice between cocaine
and sugar, around 90% of rats will take the sugar (14). It is pos-
sible that there is something special about sugar that causes the
formation of long-term dispositional desires in this way. But it is
equally possible that sugar is simply highly pleasurable.8 Certainly
there is no reason to think that the rats’ desire-formation systems
are somehow malfunctioning when they develop desires for foods
that are rich in it.
6Indeed, withdrawal, horrible though it can be, plays a minor role in addiction;
consumption is not primarily motivated by a desire to avoid it.
7We say “can,” for it remains an open question why most people who consume
addictive drugs do not become addicted to them (most people in the West drink
alcohol, but most do not become alcoholics); and likewise why most animals do not
consume addictive drugs if they have attractive alternatives (see below). It could be
that they are less prone to form the relevant incentive salience desires; it could be
that they form competing desires more strongly; or it could be that they are better
at self control. For a survey of the mounting evidence for the former, see Saunders
and Robinson (140).
8For a review of the evidence that there is more going on in the formations of desires
for sugar than simply the activity of the dopamine system see DiLeone et al. (141)
and Ahmed et al. (142).
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Nor is there reason to think that things are any different for
human beings. It has become commonplace to speak of sugar
addiction; it is true that many subjects’ desires for sugar have a
great deal in common with addicts’ desires for drugs. They too
manifest in cravings that are highly cue-dependent, that are very
powerful, and that persist in the face of the conviction that it would
be better to eat less sugar. As with the consumption of sugar, so
with many other pleasurable behaviors. Gambling, sex, surfing the
web, watching daytime television – all of these have been alleged
to give rise to addiction.
But we need to distinguish two things here: the “hijacking”
of the desire-formation process that occurs with addictive drugs;
and the nature of incentive salience desires themselves. The first
of these features is unique to drugs: only substances that lead to
artificial dopamine stimulation will hijack the desire-formation
process in this way. We have no reason to think that sugar “addic-
tion” results from a hijacking: there is no evidence that sugar leads
to artificial boosts in dopamine. It is even more obvious that web-
surfing and gambling do not stimulate dopamine in this way (since
they are not ingested). So in none of these cases is there reason to
think that the dopamine system has malfunctioned. Yet in every
case there is reason to think that the motives to engage in these
behaviors are insulated from the agent’s beliefs about what would
be good. Incentive salience desires have this feature regardless of
how they are acquired. It is exactly this feature that leads to the
talk of addiction, since it is what substance and non-substance
“addictions” have in common. Agents genuinely want to stop; and
yet still they feel the pull of the desire.
We are therefore faced with a terminological choice: do we
reserve the term “addiction” for desires formed by means of the
dopamine hijacking process, and so say that sugar and gambling
addictions are not addictions proper? Or do we use the term
“addiction” to refer more generally to the predicament an agent
faces when she has sufficiently strong and uncontrolled incentive
salience desires, whatever their origin – and thus say that sugar and
gambling addictions can be genuine addictions after all? Of course
in a sense nothing hinges on the choice: once we are clear on the
phenomena, it should not matter how we use the words. Never-
theless, talk of addiction brings with it so many expectations that
in practical terms the choice matters deeply. We are torn on this
question: RH is inclined to take the first option; BD leans toward
the second. In the rest of the paper, we will side with BD and take
the more inclusive definition, whilst saying nothing about the dif-
ficult question of when a “normal” desire for gambling or sucrose
should be seen as an addiction.
What it is important to realize is that there is a contrast between
these incentive salience desires, however caused, and many of
our other desires. While incentive salience desires are by nature
insensitive to our judgments about what is good, not all desires
share this feature. In many cases, a desire is bound up with a rea-
son or a justification: to want something is to want it for some
reason.9 As one’s confidence in the reason diminishes, so the
desire diminishes. Suppose that one of your favorite companies
9Such an approach has been advocated, in rather different ways, by Scanlon (143)
and Railton (144). We agree that some desires have this feature, but deny that this is
the only kind of desire
is bringing out a new model of some device that you particu-
larly like; moved by the advance publicity you start to develop
a hankering for it. But now the reviews come out, and without
fail they are dismissive. The thing is clunky, ill-conceived, badly
engineered, a definite step backwards. Your desire withers. You do
not need to resist or overcome it. Once your beliefs have changed
so that you see no reason to continue, the desire is no longer
there. We do not have to think that these reason-based desires are
always instrumental, i.e., that we only have them in order to get
some other thing. But they are bound up with their reasons in
such a way that they do not have a life of their own: they can-
not live on without them, unlike the incentive salience desires,
which can. We will call such desires cognitive desires, since they
are sensitive to our cognition in a way incentive salience desires
are not.
We should also distinguish incentive salience desires from
another class of motivational states, namely habits. These clearly
often play a role in addiction: it is not for nothing that we speak of
an addict’s “habit.” Like incentive salience desires they are cued by
circumstance, and often result in behavior that the agent rejects.
Yet in so far as we have a good behavioral grip on them – behaviors
like thumb-sucking, nail-biting, hair-pulling, and muscle tics –
they differ in one crucial respect. The most effective treatment
for them is habit reversal therapy, which involves monitoring the
habit, and then learning an alternative response (15).10 And it
seems that the most important part of this is simply the moni-
toring [(16); see also Ref. (17)]. Habits work automatically, but
once they are monitored, the agent can override them. In contrast,
while incentive salience desires are sometimes combined with an
automatic element (reaching unawares for a cigarette), becoming
aware of that element is not enough to remove their force. If they
are to be resisted, they need to be overcome.
Let us summarize this section so far. We have contended that
there are at least two distinct kinds of desire at play in human
motivation. First, there are incentive salience desires, which are
formed for objects on the basis of their previous association with
either rewarding experience (when the system is functioning well)
or artificial dopamine stimulation (when the system is hijacked
by addictive drugs). These desires form the motivational basis
of addiction, but also play an ever-present role in non-addicted
agents’ motivation, encompassing at least the sphere of motives
we normally call “appetites” even when these are well-regulated
(desires for food, drink, sex, and many other typically pleasurable
stimuli). Crucially, incentive salience desires motivate indepen-
dently from an agent’s reflective judgments about what is valuable
or even pleasurable. This distinguishes incentive salience desires
from a second kind of desires, cognitive desires, which are sensi-
tive to and based upon an agent’s reflective beliefs about what is
valuable; e.g., the desire to read a certain book or pursue a certain
career.11
10It is very effective.
11We do not take this distinction to be exhaustive. There could be desires that are
not cognitive, in the sense that they are not sensitive to our judgments about rea-
sons, but are not incentive salience desires either, since they are not produced by the
incentive salience system. The desires involved in emotional reactions such as fear
or guilt, for example, do not seem to fall neatly into either category.
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How do these two kinds of desire, and our habits, interact to
produce intentional action? A simple model, traditional in both
psychology and philosophy, sees the efficacy of desires as simply
a function of their strength (or of their strength together with the
subject’s belief in how likely they are to be realized). On such a
model what an agent does is simply determined by what she most
wants to do. Incentive salience desires and cognitive desires will
fight it out on the basis of their strength, and the stronger desire
will control behavior.
There is a great deal of empirical evidence that tells against such
a model, evidence that suggests that action is not simply dictated
by the strongest desire. In particular, agents are not passive spec-
tators of the competition between their desires for domination
over behavior. Rather, the agent herself plays a much more active
role in determining which desire triumphs, employing self-control
to resist some desires, and to act on others. What determines an
agent’s behavior, then, is not merely how strong her desires are,
but also whether and how she exerts self-control.
Self-control is hard work. In the case of addiction, self-control
is standardly employed to try to restrain incentive salience desires
in the light of cognitive desires. Of course this attempt may not
succeed. The addict may be aware that she (cognitively) prefers
keeping her job to taking drugs, and be aware that taking drugs
will cause her to lose her job, on that basis judge that she ought
not to use, and yet still succumb to her desire for the drug. As
R. Jay Wallace puts the point: “even if one succeeds, in the face
of [an addictive] desire, in reasoning correctly to the conclusion
that it should not be acted on, its continued presence and urgency
will make it comparatively difficult to choose to comply with the
deliberated verdict one has arrived at” (Ref. (18), p. 648). More-
over, even if one chooses to comply, it is hard work to convert that
resolution into action.
Our contention here is that these points apply equally to
ordinary action. For the features of addictive desire that pose
self-control problems are features of incentive salience desires in
general, and thus are shared by a wide range of non-addictive
desires as well. Just as the motivational force of an addict’s incen-
tive salience desire for heroin persists despite her judgment that
she should not take it, the motivational force of an ordinary agent’s
incentive salience desire for a cake will persist despite her judgment
that she ought to have something more healthy instead. Whether
the agent’s judgment or craving prevails is a matter of self-control.
We have already elucidated the essential features of the incentive
salience system, and presented empirical evidence for its existence.
However, we have so far said little about the nature of self-control,
and have given no empirical argument for the existence of this
phenomenon. We now turn to this task (see The Existence of Self-
Control). Then we will be in a position to see how the different
kinds of desires are mediated by the self-control system to produce
intentional action (see Three Stages of Self-Control).
THE EXISTENCE OF SELF-CONTROL
There are various reasons for believing in the existence of self-
control as an independent system that is not reducible to strength
of desire.12 Here, we present just one argument. The existence
12See [(6), pp. 112–136].
of a psychological system dedicated to a particular function is
frequently accepted on the basis of evidence of a selective impair-
ment in that function. For instance, autistic persons’ selective
impairment in social cognition has been taken as strong evidence
for the existence of a psychological system dedicated to social cog-
nition (19), and prosopagnosic persons’ selective impairment in
identifying faces has been taken as strong evidence for the existence
of a perceptual system dedicated to face identification (20, 21). In
general, a functionally specific impairment that shows up across
multiple subjects seems best explained by positing the existence of
a functionally specialized psychological system that is impaired or
damaged in that subject population. Furthermore, by comparing
these impaired subjects to healthy controls, we can uncover the
causal–functional roles of the posited system.
Here, we follow this broad strategy, contending that the behav-
ioral abnormalities of two different populations are best explained
by a selective impairment in self-control: patients with lesions in
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and (healthy) sub-
jects who have undergone ego depletion. However, our claim here
is more limited than those that have been made about social
cognition or face recognition. We are not arguing that the sys-
tem involved in self-control is exclusively dedicated to the task:
that would require showing that only self-control is affected in
these subjects, which is far from obvious (not least because we
are not yet clear on what counts as an exercise of self-control
and what does not). Our point is rather that the subjects in the
two groups show a systematic loss of self-control even though
there is no reason to think that their desires and beliefs have
been affected; and hence that we have good reason for positing
some kind of system that is responsible for self-control, whether
or not that system is also responsible for other, unrelated processes
as well.
Our pairing of vmPFC lesions and ego depletion may seem
surprising, given that the two subject groups have been studied
separately and in different subdisciplines (neuropsychology and
social psychology). However, these two groups have an important
common feature: they both behave as we would expect people to
behave who are motivated overwhelmingly by incentive salience
desires. This indicates that the motivational system that coun-
teracts incentive salience desires’ effects on behavior is selectively
impaired in these subject groups. As we will argue, these subjects’
deficits are best explained by appeal to the impairment of a psy-
chological system that serves the function of governing behavior
on the basis of cognitive desires. That is, these subjects seem to be
suffering from selective impairment of the self-control system as
we have described it.
This raises the question: how should we expect a person to
behave who is motivated solely by incentive salience desires? We
can make important predictions based on a single observation
about how incentive salience desires are acquired: a dispositional
incentive salience desire for an end state E is formed on the basis of
past associations between E and a simultaneous dopamine reward
signal (usually caused by pleasure, though sometimes caused by
artificial dopamine stimulation, as with addictive drugs). The
strength of a dispositional incentive salience desire for any end
state E is proportional to the (recency-weighted) average of the
past reward signals that have been associated with E (9).
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Thus we can predict that incentive salience desires will
only motivate agents to pursue ends that have been previously
associated with co-occurrent reward. This means that agents will
be unable to form incentive salience desires for ends that are not
immediately rewarding, or not rewarding to the agent, since accom-
plishing these ends will not bring about a co-occurrent reward.
This rules out two important kinds of ends. First, incentive salience
desires will not motivate agents to pursue long-term goals, which
produce valuable or rewarding consequences only long after their
end states have been attained. Examples of such goals include the
goal to pass an examination, the goal to lower one’s cholesterol,
and (notably) the goal to quit an addictive drug: the benefits of
achieving each of these goals accrue to the agent only long after
the goal has been achieved. Second, incentive salience desires will
not motivate agents to pursue other-regarding goals that, while
they produce good consequences for others, are not immediately
rewarding to the agent. Many moral and altruistic goals are likely
to fall under this category: e.g., the goal to be honest when there is a
prudential incentive to lie, the goal to avoid socially inappropriate
or offensive behavior, and the goal to help others with whom one
does not empathically identify.13 So we can predict that a person
who is motivated solely by incentive salience desires will pursue
predominantly self-regarding and immediately rewarding goals.14
Both vmPFC lesion patients and ego depleted subjects fit this
prediction well. We will start with the vmPFC lesion patients, as
their deficit is more dramatic.
Since Phineas Gage, the first recorded and most famous case of
vmPFC lesioning, the two most salient features of vmPFC-lesioned
patients have been their severe deficits in socially appropriate
behavior and long-term planning (22). vmPFC lesion patients
usually display “acquired sociopathy,” a disorder characterized
by dampened and poorly regulated emotions as well as dis-
turbed social decision-making. This typically causes vmPFC lesion
patients, post-trauma, to be unable to maintain healthy social
relationships or gainful employment (23, 24).
In addition to their sociopathic behavior, vmPFC lesion
patients seem unable to base their behavior on the long-term con-
sequences of their actions. The most famous demonstration of this
deficit comes from the Iowa Gambling Task [IGT; (25)]. The IGT
presents subjects with four decks of cards, which give differing
monetary rewards when subjects draw from them. Two high-risk
decks give large immediate rewards, but result in a long-term loss
by giving even larger punishments; two low-risk decks present the
long-term optimal option, yielding small but consistent rewards.
Healthy control subjects will start by sampling all decks, temporar-
ily favor the high-risk decks, and then learn to choose the low-risk
decks after receiving punishment. vmPFC lesion patients, on the
other hand, will continue to favor the high-risk decks throughout
the task. The best explanation for this pattern seems to be that the
13This last qualification is necessary since there is some evidence that helping those
with whom one does empathize can be rewarding in itself. In general, our argument
applies only to moral behavior that is not intrinsically pleasurable; and quite where
the boundaries of that lie is not yet clear.
14It is important to emphasize that we do not take this characterization to apply gen-
erally to addicts, but only to persons driven exclusively by incentive salience desires;
as we argue later in this section, it is implausible to think that this is true of most
addicts. Thanks to Hanna Pickard for pressing us to clarify this point.
vmPFC lesion patients are motivated by the short-term rewards
offered by the high-risk decks,and cannot change their behavior on
the basis of the cognitive desire to maximize their long-term payoff
and the judgment that those decks have a suboptimal long-term
predicted payoff.15
As has been noted since the first studies, however, vmPFC lesion
patients typically display normal intelligence, intact knowledge of
social norms, and the ability to make accurate predictions about
future social and non-social consequences (26, 27). This indi-
cates that these patients’ impairment is motivational rather than
cognitive.
We submit that the best explanation for these results is that
vmPFC lesion patients’ behavior is guided overwhelmingly by the
incentive salience system, which activates self-regarding and short-
term goals. This is why vmPFC lesion patients show deficits in the
two otherwise unrelated domains of moral behavior and long-
term goal pursuit: both kinds of behavior require the capacity to
set and pursue goals to achieve end states that are not immediately
associated with rewarding experience.16 However, these patients
have normal explicit beliefs and evaluative judgments about what
is good. So vmPFC lesion patients seem to be selectively impaired
in their ability to act on their cognitive desires. This indicates
that there is a psychological system, instantiated in or dependent
upon the vmPFC, that (among other things) serves the function
of controlling behavior on the basis of cognitive desires – i.e., the
self-control system.
The self-control system can be impaired in healthy subjects
as well, as is shown by studies on ego depletion. The ego deple-
tion finding is that healthy (non-lesioned) subjects who exert
self-control on one task will subsequently perform less well than
control subjects on a second, unrelated task that also requires
self-control (28). The large literature on ego depletion has demon-
strated that many different kinds of task are ego depleting, from
attention regulation (29) to making choices (30) to analytical
thought (31). However, for our purposes, the most important ego
depleting tasks are the motivational tasks, where subjects must
exert self-control in order to override some desires in favor of oth-
ers. On these tasks, ego depleted subjects show a similar pattern
to vmPFC patients: they are selectively impaired in the pursuit of
other-regarding and long-term goals.
Begin with other-regarding goals. The following results all sup-
port the claim that ego depleted subjects are less able to suppress
selfish desires for the sake of other people:
• Ego depleted subjects are less likely to volunteer to help a victim
of a tragedy (32).
15For more evidence beyond the IGT supporting the idea that vmPFC lesion patients
are insensitive to long-term consequences, see [Refs. (145, 146)].
16To return to an earlier point: we are not claiming that this is the only deficit
that occurs in vmPFC lesion patients. Naturally occurring brain lesions are messy
by nature and will rarely selectively impair a single psychological process without
disrupting others. For instance, vmPFC lesion patients’ reported abnormalities in
moral judgment (147), social cognition (148), and affective experience (23) are not
straightforwardly explained by our hypothesis that they suffer from impaired self-
control. However, we think our hypothesis provides a better explanation for vmPFC
lesion patients’ deficits in social behavior and long-term planning than the emotion-
based explanation given by Damasio (22), though we do not have the space to argue
this point here.
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• Ego depleted subjects are more likely to lie about their perfor-
mance for monetary gain (33).
• Ego depleted subjects express more interest in sleeping with
someone other than their romantic partner, are less able to
suppress sexually inappropriate thoughts, and are more likely
to inappropriately engage in sexual behavior with their dat-
ing partner in the laboratory when given an opportunity to do
so (29).
• Ego depleted subjects are less effective at social self-
presentation – for example, they are more likely to speak or
disclose an inappropriate amount in conversation (34).
• Ego depleted subjects are more likely to respond destructively
than constructively when their relationship partner behaves
destructively (35).
• Ego depleted subjects are more likely to respond with aggression
after an insult (36).
Moving on to long-term goals, the following results all support the
claim that ego depleted subjects are less able to suppress short-term
desires for the sake of long-term gain:
• Ego depleted subjects are less likely to choose to eat radishes
rather than chocolates, or to restrain themselves from eating
cookies when on a diet (28).
• Ego depleted subjects’ consumption of M&M’s candies is bet-
ter predicted by their implicit evaluations of M&M’s than
by their explicitly stated desires to eat healthy, while non-
depleted control subjects’ consumption of M&M’s is better
predicted by their explicit desires to diet than by their implicit
evaluations (37).
• Ego depleted subjects are less likely to restrain themselves from
drinking too much beer when they expect to take a driving test
afterward (38).
• Ego depleted subjects are less likely to choose to study for a test
rather than procrastinate by reading magazines or playing video
games (30).
• Ego depleted subjects will drink less of a healthy but bad-tasting
beverage (30).
• Ego depleted subjects are more likely to spend money impul-
sively when given the chance (39).
All these seem to be cases where the long-term value of a future
outcome (e.g., health, sobriety in a driving test, achievement, sav-
ings) needs to override a craving to pursue some immediately
rewarding end (cookies, chocolate, beer, video games, and impulse
spending).
Like vmPFC patients, ego depleted subjects show a selective
impairment that results in the relative domination of their behav-
ior by incentive salience desires. Non-depleted subjects are better
able to pursue long-term and other-regarding goals that cannot be
activated by incentive salience desires. We think this data should
be explained in the same way that we have explained the motiva-
tional deficits of vmPFC-lesioned patients. Healthy, non-depleted
human agents are different from vmPFC lesion patients and ego
depleted subjects in that they have a fully functioning self-control
system, which is impaired or absent in these other populations.
The self-control system enables healthy agents to override their
incentive salience desires and control their behavior in accordance
with their cognitive desires. This allows their motivational reper-
toire to include moral considerations, altruistic concern, and the
long-term consequences of their actions. The powerful explana-
tion of these two disparate bodies of data that we attain by positing
the self-control system is, we submit, sufficient reason to accept its
existence.17
Let us pause to address a worry regarding our argument’s appeal
to the ego depletion findings.18 One might be wary of drawing any
conclusions from the ego depletion findings, given the controversy
that surrounds them. Given how hotly debated many of Baumeis-
ter and colleagues’ claims about ego depletion have been, is not it a
bad idea to take those claims as premises in an argument? Though
this concern is natural, closer examination reveals that the contro-
versies surrounding ego depletion are orthogonal to our central
claims.
First, there is an ongoing debate regarding the replicability of
one of the empirical findings in the ego depletion literature. But
this debate concerns not the central ego depletion finding itself,
but a certain hypothesis about its physiological mechanism: Gail-
liot and Baumeister’s (40) claim that ego depletion is mediated
by depletion of glucose in the bloodstream. Despite the origi-
nal findings in support of this claim, more recent experiments
have called it into question [e.g., Ref. (41, 42)]. However, our
argument does not rely on this questionable finding. We only
appeal to the ego depletion finding itself: the finding that sub-
jects who exert self-control on one task perform less well than
controls on subsequent self-control tasks. This finding has been
replicated over 100 times, according to Inzlicht and Schmeichel
(43). A recent meta-analysis of 83 studies reports that the ego
depletion effect is both highly statistically significant (p < 0.001)
and of medium-to-large size [Cohen’s d = 0.62; (44), p. 508].
Though there are still some skeptics [see Ref. (45)], the reliabil-
ity and replicability of the ego depletion finding itself is widely
accepted.
The other locus of controversy concerns what we call the
depletion question: how does exerting self-control on one task
impair self-control performance on subsequent tasks? Several
answers to this question have been proposed. Most promi-
nently, Roy Baumeister and colleagues have argued that self-
control tasks all depend upon and use up a limited resource,
which they call “willpower” (46). Their answer to the deple-
tion question is simple: the first task uses up the willpower
17Levy (7) offers a similar argument for the existence of the self-control system,
though he takes it to be part of System 2. However, Levy’s view differs significantly
from ours, in that he takes the self-control system to play an exclusively cognitive
role: “ego depletion is caused by engagement in any of the much broader class of
system 2 processes, which involve effortful cognitive processing” [(7), p. 147]. He
argues that self-control’s role in overcoming temptation is fully mediated by its
role in forming accurate, unbiased beliefs about what is best to do [see also (51,
52)]. While we agree that this is one of the functions of self-control (see Deliberative
stage), we differ from Levy in ascribing to the self-control system some directly moti-
vational functions as well. A result of this difference is that Levy’s picture omits the
very role of the self-control system we have most emphasized: namely, its function
of overriding an agent’s incentive salience desires to control behavior in accordance
with her cognitive desires. So, though Levy’s argument is similar to ours, it does not
suffice for the point we wish to make here.
18Thanks to Serge Ahmed and Bennett Foddy for both raising this worry.
www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 139 | 7
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dill and Holton The addict in us all
resource, leaving less willpower available than is necessary for opti-
mum performance on the second task. However, this “resource
theory” has recently been challenged by alternative accounts
that claim we can explain ego depleted subjects’ impairment
without appealing to a limited willpower resource. Several of
these “anti-resource” accounts have been proposed (43, 47–49).
Though the details of their accounts differ, these theorists all
argue that exerting self-control decreases subjects’ motivation to
exert further self-control – either by changing their beliefs or
their desires – rather than by depleting a limited self-control
resource.
It may seem that we need to take a stand on this controversy,
siding with the resource theorist in claiming that there is a lim-
ited willpower resource that is depleted by self-control exertion.
However, our argument does not require this claim. In fact, we
think our argument is consistent with both the resource and anti-
resource answers to the depletion question. To see how, we need
to distinguish the depletion question from an alternative question
one might ask about the ego depletion finding, which we call the
covariance question.
The covariance question is: why does ego depletion affect the
particular tasks that it does, and not others? In other words, the
covariance question asks why the many abilities affected by ego
depletion all stand or fall together. What do emotion regulation,
making arbitrary choices, analytic thought, resisting tempting
foods, altruistic behavior, and all the other ego depleting tasks
have in common, so that ability on one of these tasks covaries
with ability on all of the others? Why does not ego depletion make
people worse at rote memory recall, instead of impairing analytic
thought? Why does ego depletion make people more selfish, rather
than making them more selfless? Why does ego depletion make
people more impulsive, rather than making them more cautious?
All of these questions fall under the umbrella of the covariance
question.
A couple hypothetical scenarios show that the covariance ques-
tion is dissociable from the depletion question. First, imagine that
the ego depletion effect only occurred for a single task: say, the
Stroop Task. The finding would be simply that subjects who per-
form the Stroop Task are subsequently impaired at further trials
of the Stroop Task, but equally good at all other tasks. Here,
there would still be an interesting depletion question: why does
doing the Stroop Task temporarily impair subjects’ performance
on the Stroop Task? But there would be no interesting covari-
ance question: it is no mystery why ability on the Stroop Task
covaries with ability on the Stroop Task. For the converse dis-
sociation, imagine that instead of ego depletion, we had found
an ego augmentation effect: that exerting self-control improved
performance on subsequent self-control tasks. Clearly there is
no depletion question to be had here, but rather an augmenta-
tion question, which would require a different kind of answer. If
the same set of tasks were involved in ego augmentation as we
have found to be involved in ego depletion, however, we would
have the very same covariance question: why does performance
on each of these tasks covary with performance on all of the
others?
We are offering an answer to the covariance question. The best
explanation for why the various abilities affected by ego depletion
stand or fall together is, we propose, that they all depend upon the
operation of the self-control system. To fully defend this claim,
we would need to provide a theory of the causal-functional role
of the self-control system, which showed how each of the tasks
that is affected by ego depletion requires the self-control system,
while each of the tasks that is unaffected by ego depletion does
not depend upon this system. This task lies beyond the scope
of this paper, though one of us (BD) hopes to undertake it in
future work. Strictly speaking, our argument here defends an
answer to only part of the covariance question: why does abil-
ity to act on the basis of long-term goals covary with ability to
act on the basis of other-regarding goals? We have argued that
the best answer to this question is that both of these abilities
depend upon a system that serves the function of overriding an
agent’s incentive salience desires to direct action on the basis of
her cognitive desires. Whether this system is also employed in
the other tasks affected by ego depletion is, as far as we have
argued, an open question – though we are inclined to think
that it is.
Our answer to the covariance question is consistent with any of
the going answers to the depletion question. Clearly, it is consis-
tent with the resource theory: on this view, all of the tasks affected
by ego depletion depend upon the operation of the self-control
system, which in turn depends upon a limited resource that is
depleted by its operation. It is also compatible with the anti-
resource theories. These theories explain depletion by appeal to
a decrease in motivation to exert self-control. This raises the ques-
tion: what is it to “exert self-control”? The most natural answer
seems to be that to exert self-control is to utilize one’s self-control
system. On the resulting anti-resource picture, depletion effects
are explained by a decrease in subjects’ motivation to employ their
system of self-control. This picture is consistent with our view
as well.
So, our view is neutral on the debate between resource and
anti-resource theorists about the mechanisms of ego depletion.
Our argument for the existence of the self-control system does
not rely on any premise that is at issue in this controversy. So, the
fact that there is controversy about the depletion question cannot
provide grounds for doubting the soundness of our argument.
We have argued that intentional action is the product of a com-
petition between two different sorts of desires that is mediated
by the self-control system. This thesis holds for both addicted
and non-addicted agents. Both addicts and others have incen-
tive salience desires, as we have already argued. These desires
motivate automatically : as soon as an incentive salience desire is
triggered, it drives an agent’s attention and behavior in pursuit
of the desired object without conscious effort (even in spite of
it). In addition, both addicts and others have cognitive desires:
desires that are based in and responsive to the agent’s reflective
judgments about what is good. In contrast with incentive salience
desires, cognitive desires may include concerns for the long-term
consequences of one’s actions, and the welfare of others as well
as oneself. For better or worse, cognitive desires do not moti-
vate behavior automatically. To guide her behavior on the basis
of her cognitive desires, an agent must exert self-control. On the
basis of data showing that some agents have a specific deficit
in their ability to act on the basis of cognitive desires, we have
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argued that there is a system, the self-control system, dedicated to
this task.
The self-control system serves primarily as the cognitive desires’
advocate within the brain. Since cognitive desires do not moti-
vate automatically, it is up to the self-control system to make
sure they are represented in the agent’s behavior. Whether an
agent acts in accordance with her cognitive desires, in the face
of a temptation to do otherwise, is not merely a matter of the
strength of her cognitive desires, but rather a matter of her abil-
ity to exert self-control on their behalf. In other words, whether
an agent’s cognitive desires triumph over her incentive salience
desires depends on whether the self-control system manages to
override the automatic influence of the incentive salience system.
We will thus more often speak of the competition between the
self-control system and the incentive salience system than of the
competition between the cognitive desires and the incentive salience
desires. But these are just two different ways of describing the same
thing.
One might be tempted to explain addiction as the result of
an impairment of the self-control system, but we think this idea
is a non-starter. If addicts had an impaired self-control system,
we would expect them to show behavioral impairments across
the board: they would not only have trouble controlling their
addictive desires, but would be self-regarding and focused on the
short-term across all other domains as well. But this is clearly
not the case: addiction does not lead to the domain-general
deficits characteristic of vmPFC lesion patients and ego depleted
subjects. Unlike vmPFC lesion patients, addicts do not act like
sociopaths; unlike ego depleted subjects, addicts do not seem to
be impaired in all tasks that require self-control, such as atten-
tion regulation or analytic thought. Moreover, given the right
incentives addicts do succeed in controlling even their addictive
desires.19
Instead, we propose that the primary difference between
addicted and non-addicted agents lies in the very strong incen-
tive salience desires possessed by the former. Whether caused by
artificial stimulation of the dopamine system (as in the case of
cocaine or amphetamines) or by the system working in the way
in which it has evolved (as in the case of sucrose) the incentive
salience desires involved in addiction are likely to be stronger than
any of the incentive salience desires experienced by non-addicted
agents. Thus it is a far greater challenge for addicts to override
their incentive salience desires, due to the abnormal motivational
force of their addictive desire. Though this self-control challenge
is far more difficult for addicts than it is for others, the struc-
ture of the challenge is the same for both, as we will now try to
show.
THREE STAGES OF SELF-CONTROL
We have claimed that intentional action results from the com-
petitive interaction amongst desires mediated by the self-control
system. This is to see self-control as in the business of regulating
which of the subject’s desires gets to determine their behav-
ior. But how does this work? Does self-control regulate which
19See Holton and Berridge (9) for discussion of this.
intentions the agent forms on the basis of their desires, or does
it rather regulate whether they stick to their intentions? And
might not it instead regulate which desires the agent has in
the first place, or which judgments they form? We need to get
clearer on what it is that self-control is controlling (or failing to
control).
The philosophical literature on addiction presents several dif-
ferent, seemingly incompatible, answers to the question of where
self-control breaks down in the case of addiction. Watson (50)
and Levy (7, 51, 52) have both argued that addictive desires
bias addicts’ evaluative judgments themselves, skewing deliber-
ation so that they come to see taking the drug as the most
attractive option. “One who is defeated by appetite is more like
a collaborationist than an unsuccessful freedom fighter,” Watson
declares colorfully [Ref. (50), p. 7]; and reiterates later: “We are
not so much overpowered by brute force as seduced” (p. 10).
Levy has developed this idea into a detailed account of addic-
tive (and non-addictive) temptation, which he summarizes as
follows:
In response to temptation the subjects spontaneously gen-
erate or retrieve from memory arguments in favor of weak-
willed action. Since they lack the cognitive resources to reject
these arguments, they experience judgment shift. They come
to judge that the benefits of succumbing to temptation are
higher than they previously had thought, or the costs of giv-
ing in are lower, or both, and they act accordingly [Ref. (51),
p. 101].
On this account, self-control works to control one’s judgments in
the face of the biasing influence of temptation.
In contrast, R. Jay Wallace argues that addictive desires make it
difficult to motivate oneself to act on one’s evaluative judgments
once they have been formed. He emphasizes this in the passage we
quoted earlier: “Even if one succeeds, in the face of such a desire,
in reasoning correctly to the conclusion that it should not be acted
on, its continued presence and urgency will make it comparatively
difficult to choose to comply with the deliberated verdict one has
arrived at” [Ref. (18), p. 648]. On this account, self-control works
to turn one’s judgments into a commitment to action: in other
words, to form an intention to act.
Finally, Timothy Schroeder and Nomy Arpaly emphasize the
power of habits in producing addictive behavior, observing that
these automatic behavioral dispositions may place addicts who
are trying to get sober in tempting situations, situations that tend
to undercut their intentions:
The abstinent addict will do things without thinking about
them at the time, only to find a difficult situation arising.
“Why did I agree to go to that party where everyone will be
using?” “Why did I turn down this street that leads me close
to the dealers, and not down the next street?” “Why did I
end up calling my old drug buddy when I was bored?” Ques-
tions like these are often answered by an addict’s unconscious
behavioral tendencies [Ref. (53), p. 228].
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On this account, self-control works even after one has formed an
intention, to implement that intention in the face of the obstacles
posed by one’s bad habits.20
Though each of these philosophers puts their favored locus of
self-control conflict at center stage, we think there is no genuine
disagreement between their claims. Instead, we favor a pluralist
view: there are several distinct loci of self-control conflict. This
view is advocated by Amelie Rorty in her classic article “Where
Does the Akratic Break Take Place?” (54). Rorty begins by iden-
tifying several “stages on thought’s way to action,” and observes
that “these distinctions allow us to locate the junctures where
psychological akrasia can occur, in ways that explain the occur-
rence of behavioral akrasia” (334). These “junctures” at which
self-control failure can occur are also the places where self-control
might be improved: “the place where the akratic break takes place
also locates the place where the self-reforming akrates can best
intervene to remedy his condition” (334).
In this section, we follow Rorty’s strategy: first, distinguishing
different stages by which thought leads to action; second, showing
how self-control conflict arises at each of these stages; and third,
showing how intervention at each of these stages can help an agent
win the struggle to govern her own behavior.
We propose that there are at least three distinct stages by which
thought leads to action, which we will call the deliberative stage,
the volitional stage, and the implemental stage:
(1) In the deliberative stage, the agent forms a judgment as to what
action is best. This is the locus of self-control conflict Watson
and Levy identified: the deliberative challenge of coming to a
clear-eyed evaluative judgment in spite of the biasing influence
of incentive salience craving.
(2) In the volitional stage, the agent chooses an intention to pur-
sue. This is the locus of self-control conflict Wallace identified:
the volitional challenge of willing yourself to pursue the end
you have already judged to be best.
(3) In the implemental stage, the agent selects actions that imple-
ment her chosen intention. This is the locus of self-control
conflict Schroeder and Arpaly identified: since habits are
brute, unmotivated behavioral dispositions, they can cause
goal-discrepant behaviors even when one is fully committed
20Henden (149) argues that compulsive actions (which he takes addictive actions
to be) are caused by habits: “an action is compulsive, not because it is caused by
an irresistible desire, but because it is part of a habit the compulsive person would
find extremely difficult to discontinue even if she made a sincere effort to do so”
(363). He would thus seem to be another advocate of the view that the locus of
self-control conflict lies in the regulation of habits. However, Henden uses “habit” in
a much wider sense than we do: he defines “habits” as “behavior patterns regularly
performed in characteristic circumstances” (371). In contrast, we are using “habit”
to refer to a particular psychological state, distinct from desires, goals, or intentions,
that involves a strong and rigid association between a contextual cue and a behavior
that causes the behavior to be automatically triggered by the cue (see Implemental
stage for more detail). Thus “habits” in Henden’s sense may or may not be caused by
“habits” in our sense. In fact, a closer reading of Henden reveals that the “habits” he
takes to underlie addiction are caused, not by the rigid stimulus-response associa-
tions we are calling “habits,” but rather by incentive salience desires, which Henden
calls “inclinations.” Thus we do not take Henden to advocate the view that the locus
of self-control is the regulation of habits, in the sense we are using the term. Thanks
to Hanna Pickard for drawing our attention to this connection with Henden’s work.
to a goal pursuit. So, it is during the implemental stage that
one must grapple with and overcome one’s habits.21, 22
We now proceed to discuss these stages in detail, with the aim of
showing how self-control at each stage works similarly in addicted
and non-addicted agents alike. For each stage we then briefly out-
line the ways in which self-control might be improved, again for
both addicts and non-addicts alike.
DELIBERATIVE STAGE
Locus of deliberative self-control conflict: attention
As we have said (see The Existence of Self-Control), a central
function of the self-control system is to control behavior on the
basis of an agent’s all-things-considered judgments of the values
of potential actions and their outcomes. But in order to do this,
an agent must first form the evaluative judgments on the basis
of which she aims to control her behavior. This involves cre-
ating mental simulations of various potential actions and their
consequences, and then comparing them against one another on
the basis of relevant evaluative criteria. This task of practical
deliberation requires the agent to keep several different detailed
simulations of actions in working memory simultaneously, attend
to the evaluatively relevant features of each, and then compare
them against one another. Since the capacity of working mem-
ory is limited, an agent will only be able to focus on a sub-
set of the potentially relevant features of her different options.
Thus what judgment she ultimately forms will depend to a large
extent on what evaluatively relevant considerations capture her
attention.
Consider, for instance, an alcoholic deliberating about whether
to have another drink at a business dinner with a client. What
choice she judges best will depend on what features of her options
she attends to while deliberating. If she focuses exclusively on the
features she finds attractive about the drink – the refreshing, pine-
tree taste of a gin and tonic, the loose euphoria of inebriation – she
will judge that having another drink is the thing to do. However,
if she attends to the longer-term consequences of having another
drink – the resulting drunkenness rendering her unable to com-
port herself appropriately in front of her client, her potentially
losing business as a result, and the negative consequences of this
21The stages we propose are inspired by Peter Gollwitzer’s highly influential Rubicon
model of action phases (150). Though our division of stages does not correspond
exactly with Gollwitzer’s, we doubt this reveals a substantive disagreement, but
rather reflects a difference in focus. Along similar lines, our stages are not the same
as Rorty’s proposed stages, but we think this is only because Rorty makes more fine-
grained distinctions between stages than we do. Though we have limited ourselves
to only those distinctions between stages for which we have empirical evidence, we
are open to the possibility that there may be more useful distinctions between stages
than we have made here.
22It is important to note that these stages are goal-relative: an agent might be in one
stage relative to one goal while in a different stage relative to another. For example,
an agent may have decided to take a trip to New York; having formed this intention,
she is now in the implemental stage of this goal pursuit. However, in the process
of implementing her intention, she will need to deliberate about further matters:
should she take the train or a plane? Thus she might be in the deliberative stage
regarding the question of how to get to New York even while she is in the imple-
mental stage regarding her intention to go to New York. So the question to ask is
not: what stage of self-control is this agent in full stop; but rather: what stage of
self-control is this agent in for this particular goal pursuit ?
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for her professional reputation and career – she will likely judge
that she ought to order a soda water instead. The judgment she
makes about what is best to do will depend upon how she directs
her attention during the process of deliberation.
The self-control and incentive salience systems will pull an
agent’s attention in different directions as she deliberates. An active
incentive salience desire pulls an agent’s attention to the attrac-
tive features of its object, thereby biasing the agent’s deliberation
in its favor. Only by exerting self-control can an agent attend to
the reasons not to act in accordance with her incentive salience
desires – i.e., the long-term consequences of her actions for things
she reflectively values. It is thus over the control of attention that
the deliberative stage of the competition between self-control and
incentive salience is waged.
Role of the incentive salience and self-control systems in
deliberation
If we are correct that the self-control system is the system that is
impaired by ego depletion, then we can infer its functions from
the capacities that are impaired in ego depleted subjects. It is thus
instructive that ego depleted subjects show impairments in both
analytic thought (31, 55, 56) and selective attention (29, 31, 40).
Since practical deliberation requires both selective attention and
analytic thought, we should expect ego depleted subjects to be
impaired in this capacity as well. This means that the self-control
system not only serves the function of controlling behavior on the
basis of evaluative judgments already made, but is also deployed
in the formation of evaluative judgments themselves.
However, the self-control system does not have complete sov-
ereignty over attention. An active incentive salience desire exerts
powerful influence over attention, drawing it toward the desired
object and its most attractive features. This involuntary attentional
pull has a significant biasing effect on practical deliberation. By
automatically directing an agent’s attention to the most attractive
features of the desired object, an incentive salience desire can lead
an agent to form evaluative judgments that give disproportionate
weight to these features. This can lead agents subject to incen-
tive salience cravings to form evaluative judgments that treat the
desired object as much more valuable than they would judge it to
be in the absence of craving.
This biasing effect has been demonstrated in empirical stud-
ies on both addicts and non-addicts alike. The most vivid display
of this effect in non-addicts comes from a study in which the
experimenters asked male subjects to answer survey questions
while looking at pornography and masturbating (57). The sex-
ually aroused subjects, when compared with non-aroused con-
trols, reported being significantly more willing to engage in sexual
behaviors they considered deviant (e.g., bisexual group sex) and
to act immorally in order to have sex (e.g., slipping a woman
a drug to get her to have sex). The influence of these subjects’
active sexual desire went beyond their overt behavior, biasing
even their judgments about what it would be pleasurable or
morally acceptable to do. Less dramatically, some studies have
shown that occurrent cravings for food make people overesti-
mate how much they will enjoy foods in the future [(58); see also
(59)]. Hence why it is dangerous to go grocery shopping while
hungry.
Addictive desires have the same kind of biasing influence on
evaluative judgment as sexual desire and hunger, as demonstrated
by Badger et al. (60). Badger et al. studied a set of heroin addicts
undertaking rehabilitation treatment who were receiving daily a
heroin substitute medication Buprenorphine (BUP) to alleviate
withdrawal symptoms. The experimental task asked these sub-
jects to choose between receiving different amounts of money
and receiving an extra dose of BUP, to be administered five days
later.23 The crucial manipulation was that one group of subjects
was asked to make this choice while in a current state of craving,
before they had received that day’s dose of BUP, while a second
group of subjects was asked to make the same choices while sati-
ated, immediately after receiving their dose of BUP. The satiated
subjects placed a substantially lower dollar value on the extra dose
of BUP ($35) than the craving subjects, who valued the extra dose
almost twice as much ($60). Notice that the difference in value
here is for a dose to be received 5 days later – so subjects had no
reason to think their current state of craving would have any influ-
ence on their enjoyment of the extra dose. And yet the currently
craving addicts still judged receiving an extra dose 5 days later to be
a more valuable outcome than the satiated addicts did. This seems
best explained by the attention-biasing effect of active incentive
salience desires: by drawing the craving subjects’ attention to the
attractive features of the extra BUP, their desire led them to judge
it more valuable than they would have in the absence of craving.
How to improve deliberative self-control: mindfulness meditation
So, active incentive salience desires bias attention in both addicts
and non-addicts, leading agents to disproportionately value the
object of their current craving in their deliberative judgments
about what is best. But agents can overcome this bias by exert-
ing self-control, directing their own attention rather than letting it
be guided by their current desire. This account yields a testable pre-
diction: deliberative self-control can be aided by improving agents’
selective attention. In other words, the better an agent’s capacity
to control her attention, the better she will be able to overcome the
biasing influence of incentive salience-based temptation.
This prediction is confirmed by research on mindfulness medita-
tion. Mindfulness is a traditional meditative practice that involves
actively focusing one’s attention on some aspect of one’s present
experience for an extended period of time. (Paradigmatically,
one focuses on the experience of breathing.) Among the many
psychological benefits of training in mindfulness meditation is
an improvement in selective attention: both brief and long-term
mindfulness training improve subjects’ability to selectively control
their attention, as measured by many classic tests of attention regu-
lation (61–63). If our picture of deliberative self-control is correct,
then these improvements in selective attention should help sub-
jects to better resist incentive salience desires. And this is exactly
what the data shows.
This prediction has been robustly confirmed in studies of
addicts [for a review, see Ref. (64)]. Randomized and controlled
23Subjects who chose the extra dose would receive two doses of BUP rather than
one on the appointed day. This was a significant incentive: “Although a single dose
of BUP is sufficient to eliminate addicts’ acute cravings, a double dose produces a
longer, more satisfying high” [(60), p. 869].
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studies testing a mindfulness training intervention for addic-
tion have shown that mindfulness training leads to a significant
reduction in use of the addictive substance and a significantly
lower chance of relapse, both when compared to a no-treatment
baseline (65, 66) and when compared to conventional addiction
treatments (67–69). One study found that smokers high on dis-
positional mindfulness measures are less likely to relapse after
quitting than smokers lower in dispositional mindfulness (70).
Finally, at least two studies have found that addicts who undergo
mindfulness training not only use the addictive substance less, but
also experience less intense cravings for the substance (68, 71).
Mindfulness-based interventions help non-addicts to over-
come incentive salience temptations as well. In particular, several
studies have shown mindfulness training to help obese or over-
weight subjects to achieve their weight-loss goals [(72–74); see
also (75, 76)]. In a recent review, O’Reilly et al. (77) found that
18 out of 21 reviewed studies of mindfulness-based interventions
for obesity-related behaviors reported significant decreases in the
targeted behaviors.
One study directly supports our hypothesis that the mecha-
nism behind these successful interventions is an improvement in
deliberative self-control (78). This study investigated the temporal
discounting of food rewards in obese and healthy-weight indi-
viduals by offering them a choice between a large, delayed food
reward and a small, immediate food reward. In an initial test,
obese subjects showed a much steeper discounting curve than con-
trols – that is, they were willing to give up a larger delayed reward
for a smaller immediate reward. This is what we would expect,
given that the obese subjects are experiencing a stronger incentive
salience craving for food, which draws their attention dispropor-
tionately to the attractive features of the immediate reward. After
the initial test, some of the obese subjects undertook a 50-min
training session in mindful eating, while others just watched an
educational video on nutrition. These subjects then completed
the temporal discounting test again. Obese subjects who under-
went mindfulness training subsequently showed a significantly less
steep discounting curve than they had in the initial test: they were
more willing than before to give up a smaller immediate reward
for the sake of a larger delayed reward. (Subjects who watched
the educational video showed no such improvement.) What this
suggests is that the brief mindfulness training session helped the
obese subjects to overcome the biasing effect of their food crav-
ings and form more normal judgments about the relative values
of immediate and delayed rewards. In other words, mindfulness
training improved these subjects’ deliberative self-control.
We submit that our model of deliberative self-control provides
the best explanation for the above results. An important first step
in overcoming an active incentive salience desire is to form a clear-
eyed evaluative judgment that indulging one’s craving will lead
to worse consequences than refraining from doing so. An active
incentive salience desire automatically biases one’s attention to
the positive features of the object desired, leading agents to over-
estimate the value of satisfying their current desire. Mindfulness
meditation training makes agents more skilled at self-controlled
attention regulation, and thereby improves their ability to resist
the biasing effect of active incentive salience desires on evaluative
judgment. It is thus by improving agents’ capacities for deliberative
self-control that mindfulness meditation helps addicts and non-
addicts alike resist the influence of their incentive salience desires.
VOLITIONAL STAGE
Locus of volitional self-control conflict: goals
The second stage of self-control is the volitional stage: after one
judges what is best (deliberative stage), one must choose a goal
to pursue (volitional stage) before one begins implementing that
goal pursuit in one’s behavior (implemental stage). In other words,
between judgment (deliberative) and action (implemental) lies
choice (volitional), and to exert volitional self-control is to exert
self-control in choosing a course of action. This was the self-
control task identified by Wallace, of “choos[ing] to comply with
the deliberated verdict one has arrived at” (648).
Some readers may be skeptical that the act of making a choice
is really distinct from the act of forming an evaluative judgment.
Our first response would be to note that the possibility of akrasia,
choosing against one’s own best judgment, seems to require such
a distinction. But, of course, people who are skeptical about the
judgment/choice distinction will be skeptical about the existence
of akrasia as well, and so this line of argument will seem to be
begging the question.24
However, we think there is empirical evidence demonstrating
that making a choice is psychologically distinct from forming
an evaluative judgment. A study by Vohs et al. [(30), Study 6]
shows that choosing to act on one’s evaluative judgments (voli-
tion) requires more self-control than merely forming evaluative
judgments (deliberation). In this study, all subjects were presented
with a webpage that gave various options for customizing a desk-
top computer for purchase. Some subjects were asked to choose
between the customizations (the choice condition), while others
were asked to consider the customization options and “form an
opinion of the information, thinking about what [they] would
prefer” (892), but importantly, were not asked to implement their
judgments by selecting their preferred options on the website (the
deliberation condition).
The dependent measure of this study was subjects’ subsequent
persistence on an impossible anagram task, a task that has been
shown to measure self-control capacity (28). What Vohs et al.
found was that subjects in the choice condition, who had made a
series of active choices, persisted significantly less on this task than
subjects in the deliberation condition. This shows that the act of
choosing involves an exertion of self-control that goes beyond the
self-control required to form an evaluative judgment. These results
not only dissociate choice from evaluative judgment, but also show
that choice involves the exertion of self-control. In other words,
this study establishes the existence of volitional self-control as a
psychological task that is distinct from deliberation to a judgment.
So let us take as given the existence of volitional self-control
and now ask what it involves. What is the psychological process
involved in making a choice, and why might it require self-control?
24It might also be the case that evaluative judgments are formed subsequently to
the intentions: in the light of what an agent has decided to do, cognitive dissonance
motivations might lead her to form judgments that present those decisions in a good
light. But we still contend that intentions and judgments have genuine independent
existence [see Ref. (6), pp. 1–19].
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We suggest that the exercise of choice involves the selection and
activation of a kind of motivational mental state that psychologists
call a “goal.” A goal, in the technical sense used by psychologists,
is a mental representation of a desired end that directs behavior
in pursuit of that end.25 We take it that such states often consti-
tute intentions, as philosophers understand this term. The large
research literature on goals, which we do not have the space to
review here, has shown them to be a robust psychological natural
kind with a distinctive suite of cognitive and behavioral signatures
[for a review, see Ref. (79)]. Active goals direct attention, cognition,
and behavior in a flexible and instrumentally rational way in order
to bring about the end state that they represent. One primary way
for a goal to be activated is simply for subjects to form a conscious,
deliberate intention to pursue a certain end. We thus submit that
volitional choice is best understood as the self-controlled act of
activating a goal with a certain end.
Role of the incentive salience and self-control systems in volition
We have already seen how self-control plays a role in volition: Vohs
et al.’s subjects had to exert self-control to go beyond forming a
judgment and activate a goal to act in accordance with that judg-
ment. Crucially for our purposes, however, self-controlled choice
is not the only route by which goals can be activated. Goals are
also activated automatically by incentive salience desires, as we
shall now explain.
A series of experiments by Henk Aarts and Rudd Custers have
demonstrated that a goal to pursue a certain end state can be non-
consciously activated by subliminally associating positive affect
with that end state (80–85). Aarts and Custers first demonstrated
that subliminally associating positive affect with a goal caused
subjects to report greater wanting to pursue the goal [(80), Study
1], and then showed in subsequent studies (cited above) that this
greater wanting leads subjects to behave in the ways characteris-
tic of goal activation. These results seem best explained by appeal
to incentive salience desires. We have already seen (see Desire)
that incentive salience desires are proportional in strength to the
previous association of the desired object with reward, and are
automatically activated by encounters with desire-associated stim-
uli. Thus we should expect that Aarts and Custers’ intervention
to associate positive affect with an end state would activate an
incentive salience desire to attain that end state. And as we would
predict, this association leads subjects to want to attain the goal.
This gives us good reason to think that Aarts and Custers have
activated goals in their subjects by means of creating and trigger-
ing incentive salience desires. Thus their findings strongly indicate
that an active incentive salience desire for an object automatically
and non-consciously activates a goal to attain that object, which
then directs behavior in pursuit of its attainment.
On reflection, this is exactly what we should expect. The incen-
tive salience cravings that addicts feel for heroin or non-addicts feel
for sugar or sex do not merely influence behavior by biasing delib-
erative judgment. These desires seem to have direct motivational
25We are thus using the term “goal” to refer not to the state of affairs one is pursuing
(as “goal” does when used colloquially, e.g. “my goal is to lose 5 pounds”), but rather
to the mental state that guides one’s behavior towards bringing about that state of
affairs.
power, pushing the addict to shoot up or the non-addict to bite
into the cake before either has a chance to even consider whether
this is a good idea. Incentive salience desires seem to directly guide
behavior in the absence of counteractive self-control, and now we
can see why: cravings activate goals, which automatically guide
action toward the attainment of the thing that is craved.
Thus, the challenge of volitional self-control in the face of an
active incentive salience desire is to resist the automatic activa-
tion of the goal to attain the desired object, and instead activate
an alternative goal that accords with one’s deliberative judgments
about what is best. Only one goal can guide behavior at a time;
in fact, a dominant goal actively suppresses the accessibility of the
most attractive alternative goals (86).26 Thus the self-control sys-
tem and the incentive salience system can be seen as competing
in a “horse race” of goal activation, where the winning system
is the one whose favored goal is made most active and thereby
comes to dominate downstream behavior. The stronger the incen-
tive salience desire, the more activation it will give to its favored
goal, and thus the greater exertion of self-control will be required
to activate an alternative goal enough to override it. This is why
restraining yourself from acting on an addictive desire is far more
difficult than restraining yourself from eating a chocolate cake.
How to improve volitional self-control: mental contrasting
If volitional self-control is a matter of giving sufficient activation
to one’s deliberatively chosen goal, then we should expect that
any procedure that leads to greater activation of a consciously
chosen goal will help agents to overcome temptation by incentive
salience desires. The “mental contrasting” procedure, created and
researched by Gabriele Oettingen, is an intervention of this kind.
In this procedure, subjects who wish to attain a goal are asked to
undertake two imaginative steps: first, imagine a “positive fantasy”
of the goal’s being attained, and all the beneficial consequences
that would follow goal attainment; second, mentally contrast this
positive fantasy with the“negative reality”of one’s present distance
from achieving the goal and the obstacles lying in the way of goal
attainment. Several studies have shown that this mental contrast-
ing procedure powerfully increases subjects’ motivation to attain
the goal, causing them to expend much more effort in pursuit of
the goal (87–91). What explains this effect?
We offer the following explanation. Goal pursuit research
has independently shown that the activation level of a goal
26This claim might seem counterintuitive, if we think of goals on the model of
desires. If I want to go to the opera and want to go to the movies, but only get to
pick one, I will still desire the other: at the movies, I’ll worry about what I’m missing
at the opera, or vice versa. But goals are not like desires; they are like intentions. And
though it is common to have conflicting desires, it is difficult to maintain conflicting
intentions. Though it is possible for agents to have incompatible intentions, there
is pressure, both rational and psychological, to maintain consistency among one’s
intentions. (Compare belief: though it is possible to have inconsistent beliefs, there
is pressure, both rational and psychological, to resolve any such inconsistencies once
they come to light). When I form the intention to go to the opera, my attention and
behavior are directed to the pursuit of that end, and thereby away from the end of
going to the movies. I look up the time of the opera, buy tickets, and get directions
to the opera house; I don’t look up the movie times, buy movie tickets, and get
directions to the movie theatre. This tendency for goals to narrow an agent’s focus,
excluding incompatible courses of action, is what we have in mind when we say that
“only one goal can guide behavior at a time.” Thanks to Hanna Pickard for raising
this concern.
www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 139 | 13
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dill and Holton The addict in us all
is automatically modulated based on three major factors: (a)
value, the perceived value of achieving the goal (82, 92–94); (b)
expectancy, the perceived probability of attaining the goal (93);
and (c) discrepancy, the perceived effort required to attain the goal
(95–97). Goal activation is strongest when expectancy, value, and
discrepancy are all high.
We propose that the mental contrasting procedure activates
goals by means of boosting value and discrepancy: the “positive
fantasy” increases the perceived value of attaining the goal, while
the “negative reality” increases the perceived effort required to
attain the goal. In line with this explanation is the finding that sub-
jects who only complete the “positive fantasy” component of the
procedure become less motivated to attain the goal (98). Though
this might seem initially surprising, it is easily explained by not-
ing that the positive fantasy on its own will sharply decrease the
discrepancy attributed to the goal, as subjects imagine the goal to
already be completed; it is this decrease in discrepancy that demo-
tivates these subjects.27 This is why the “negative reality” contrast,
which counteracts the adverse effects of the“positive fantasy”com-
ponent on discrepancy while maintaining its positive effects on
value, is necessary for the mental contrasting procedure to work.
Thus the mental contrasting procedure is well-designed to
increase the activation of a consciously chosen goal. So, given
our characterization of volitional self-control, we should expect
the mental contrasting procedure to help agents overcome temp-
tation by incentive salience desires. And this is what we find.
Oettingen et al. (89) found that the mental contrasting interven-
tion caused smokers who wanted to quit to take more immediate
action toward quitting than subjects who underwent a control
intervention. And for non-addicted subjects, Johannessen et al.
(99) found that dieters who performed the mental contrasting
procedure were significantly more successful than control subjects
at reducing their caloric intake over a 2-week period.
We have portrayed volitional self-control as involving a compe-
tition between the self-control and incentive salience systems over
the activation of goals. We take this picture to be nicely confirmed
by the fact that the mental contrasting procedure, which increases
the activation of deliberatively chosen goals, helps agents to over-
come temptation by both addictive and non-addictive incentive
salience desires. Mental contrasting helps agents succeed in moti-
vating themselves to act in accordance with their deliberative
judgment – which, as we have seen, is not a trivial task.
IMPLEMENTAL STAGE
Locus of implemental self-control conflict: habits
As we have said, a goal, once activated, will automatically guide
behavior toward its own fulfillment. Thus, one might think that
choosing the right goal in the face of temptation is sufficient for
controlling one’s behavior. However, goal implementation – the
process of executing one’s chosen goal pursuit in action – itself
poses non-trivial self-control challenges.
This is because goals are not the only mental states that directly
influence behavior. There are also habits, which Neal et al. (100)
27In fact, the act of imagining goal completion has been shown in one study to lead
to “goal turnoff,” the suppression of goal accessibility that usually occurs after the
goal has actually been completed (151).
define as“response dispositions that are activated automatically by
the context cues that co-occurred with responses during past per-
formance” (198). In other words, habits are associations between
contexts and behaviors that lead agents to produce a certain
behavior when they encounter a certain contextual cue.
For our purposes, it is important to distinguish habits both
from goals and from incentive salience desires. The distinction
between habits and goals is essential to understanding the differ-
ence between the volitional and implemental stages of self-control.
And as we emphasized earlier (see Desire), the habits that are
produced by addiction are an importantly different phenomenon
from the incentive salience desires that produce addiction. Habits
and incentive salience desires may each exert their influence in the
absence of the other, though they often go hand in hand.
The primary feature that distinguishes habits from goals is their
motivation-independence. As habits are associative states that pro-
duce a behavior directly when a certain context is encountered,
they do not depend for their influence on any motivation to engage
in the relevant behavior. This is in contrast with goals, which are
almost always activated by and dependent upon a desire to achieve
some end.28 When one ceases to desire the end of a certain goal
pursuit, the goal itself is deactivated (101); in contrast, when one
ceases to desire the end that is served by a certain habit, the habit
remains (102). One might, for instance, habitually make a turn
that follows the well-worn driving route to one’s workplace, when
in fact one does not want to go there at all, but rather is going to a
restaurant that is actually in the opposite direction. However, one
will never set out to pursue the goal of going to one’s workplace
when in fact one has no desire whatsoever to do so.
The primary feature that distinguishes habits from incentive
salience desires is their motivational neutrality. In addition to
exerting their influence independently from (and even contrary
to) one’s prior motives, habits also do not produce any desire to
perform the habitual behavior. In other words, one does not crave
acting out one’s habits. Schroeder and Arpaly (53) make this point
well:
When one does not do something one wanted to do, there
is often a little disappointment or regret. But when one does
not make a habitual left turn, there is no disappointment or
regret that coincides with not acting out of habit . . . [one]
neither longingly thinks of making the left turn when at other
intersections, nor is behaviorally disposed to get into a posi-
tion to make the left turn. The habit only has influence upon
behavior (231).
This apt observation about the different phenomenologies of habit
and desire is confirmed by empirical research. As we have already
mentioned (see Desire), simply learning to notice a habitual behav-
ior seems to be sufficient for ceasing it, implying that once the
subject becomes aware of the habitual behavior, it takes little
additional self-control to override it (15, 16). Contrast this with
incentive salience desires, which are still quite difficult to override
even when one is reflectively aware of them.
28A possible exception to this claim is the case of unconscious goal priming by
exposure to words semantically associated with a goal (104).
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A third feature of habits distinguishes them from both goals
and incentive salience desires: their behavioral inflexibility. Neal
and Wood (103) observe that “people rarely substitute habitual
behaviors (e.g., a habit of daily jogging) for alternative behaviors
that meet the same ostensible goal (e.g., switching from jogging
to cycling)” [Ref. (103), p. 449]. We think this observation reflects
an important fact about the structure of habits: they are associa-
tions of contexts with a particular behavior, not with an end that
can be brought about by many different behaviors. Habits rigidly
produce a certain behavior, never switching to producing a dif-
ferent behavior that better facilitates some goal. This is illustrated
by a study on habitual popcorn eating in the cinema, in which
subjects ceased to habitually eat popcorn if they were forced to do
so with their non-dominant hand (102). This result shows that
these subjects’ habit was not really to eat popcorn, but rather to
scoop popcorn into their mouths using their dominant hand. When
this behavior was no longer possible, the habit did not cause the
subjects to engage in the alternative behavior of eating with their
non-dominant hands – because that is not the particular behav-
ior they associate with the context of the cinema. In contrast,
both goals and incentive salience desires are very flexible in the
behaviors they produce, dynamically switching between behav-
ioral routines when doing so is adaptive for achieving their end
(104, 105).
In summary, habits are best understood as a brute, direct asso-
ciation between a specific context and a rigid behavior, which
produces behavior in a way that is unmediated by desire. This dis-
tinguishes habits from both goals and incentive salience desires,
allowing us to see the task of controlling one’s habits as distinct
from the task of controlling one’s goals. As it arises in the imple-
mentation of one’s goals, we will call this task the implemental stage
of self-control.
Role of the incentive salience and self-control systems in creating
habits
As Aristotle observed [Ref. (106), Nicomachean Ethics 1103a–b]
and contemporary research has confirmed (107), habits are cre-
ated by repetition. More precisely, a habit to perform a certain
behavior in a certain context is created by an agent’s perform-
ing that particular behavior in that particular context many times
before. This repetition ingrains the automatic association between
context and behavior that constitutes the habit.
Both the incentive salience and self-control systems can create
and sustain habits by this simple method. If an incentive salience
desire is served by regularly performing the same behavior in the
same context (say, ordering your usual beer at your favorite bar, or
reaching for the ice cream in your freezer upon arriving at home),
then by repeatedly acting on that incentive salience desire, one
may create a habit that serves the desire. Insofar as one disap-
proves of the incentive salience desire, these may be called “bad
habits.” Addicts, who usually spend a good while acting on their
addictive desire before seeking help, will thereby acquire many
habits that facilitate their addictive behavior. These “bad habits”
will remain even when the addict has overcome her desire for
the addictive substance, and may make it more difficult for the
addict to remain in control, as Schroeder and Arpaly point out
[Ref. (53), p. 228].
On the other hand, one may also inculcate “good habits” by
repeatedly performing a behavior in a context that facilitates one
of the cognitive desires or values on the basis of which one exerts
self-control. For instance, one might create a habit of walking
to the gym immediately after leaving work by simply exerting
the self-control required to do so deliberately every day, until it
becomes automatic and effortless. Many other examples of the self-
controlled creation of habits come from athletics, music, and other
skilled behaviors, where one exerts a great deal of self-control to
repeat a certain behavior in a precise way during practice (whether
a scale on the violin or a free-throw in basketball) and then, as one
becomes skilled, is able to do the same behavior automatically and
habitually. This self-controlled formation of “good habits” works
just the same way as the formation of “bad habits” by the incentive
salience system: produce the same behavior in the same context
over and over again, and voila! – a habit is born.
How to improve implemental self-control: implementation intentions
Implemental self-control becomes a challenge when one has a good
goal that may be thwarted by a bad habit. In other words, even once
you have succeeded at volitional self-control, activating a goal that
accords with your cognitive desires, your pursuit of this goal may
be hampered by habits that lead to goal-discrepant behaviors. This
problem will be especially dire if, as in the case of addicts, one’s
goal is to change one’s behavior from a longstanding pattern pro-
duced by the pursuit of a powerful incentive salience desire. As
Schroeder and Arpaly observe, bad habits may tip the balance in
the addict’s self-control conflict, as when an addict finds herself
habitually putting herself in situations that make drugs available
or tempting.
One strategy for implemental self-control is simply to directly
override the habit once it has been triggered. Though this works,
it is difficult, causing ego depletion in ordinary subjects (28, 32).
Overriding a habit is difficult not necessarily because it is diffi-
cult to overcome a habit once it has been detected, but because it
requires a great deal of attention regulation to constantly monitor
for the cues that trigger the habitual behavior. Given the limita-
tions of our resources for self-controlled attention, this strategy
for overcoming bad habits is itself quite limited.
An implemental self-control strategy that may escape these
limits is suggested by research on implementation intentions, a
technique created and investigated by Peter Gollwitzer. Implemen-
tation intentions are plans of the form “if I encounter X cue, then
I will perform Y response!” Subjects who form implementation
intentions to aid them in a goal pursuit have been shown in a large
number of studies to pursue their goals much more effectively
than subjects who simply form goal intentions (of the simpler
form “I will do X!”). A meta-analysis of 94 studies involving over
8,000 participants found that the improvement of goal pursuit by
implementation intentions over mere goal intentions is highly sta-
tistically significant, and medium-to-large in effect size [Cohen’s
d = 0.65; (108)].
The helpful effects of implementation intentions seem to be
largely due to the automatic association such intentions create
between the “if” cue and the “then” response. Subjects who form
implementation intentions afterward show a strong automatic
association between the “if” cue and the “then” response, reacting
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far more quickly than controls to words associated with the “then”
response after being primed with the “if” cue (109–112). This
association leads subjects to quickly and automatically execute
the intended “then” response when they encounter the specified
“if” cue. The automaticity of this process explains why imple-
mentation intentions are just as effective (and in some cases more
effective) when subjects suffer from impairments in executive con-
trol caused by cognitive load (113, 114), ego depletion (115), drug
withdrawal (113), schizophrenia (113), ADHD (116, 117), or old
age (118). The automaticity of implementation intentions is also
indicated by studies showing that subjects will execute the “then”
response of their implementation intentions even when the “if”
cue is presented subliminally (119, 120).
The attentive reader will have already noticed that the kind of
state created by implementation intentions – an automatic asso-
ciation between a cue and a response – is one and the same as
the kind of state we have identified with habits. This implies
that implementation intentions can enable an agent to deliber-
ately create new cue-response associations that can compete with
and override her old cue-response associations, i.e., her habits.
If this is correct, then implementation intentions may provide a
powerful tool for overriding unwanted habits and thus improving
implemental self-control.
The research has borne this hypothesis out: subjects who form
implementation intentions are significantly more successful at cre-
ating new habits and overriding old habits than control subjects
who form mere goal intentions to do so (112, 121–125). As we
would expect, reaction-time tasks indicate that implementation
intentions break habits by creating a new association between the
cue and the intended “then” response, which competes with the
old association between the cue and the habitual response. After
forming an implementation intention to break a habit, subjects
react equally quickly to words associated with the intended “then”
response as they do to words associated with the habitual response,
indicating that the implementation intention levels the associative
playing field (112). As the experimenters themselves put it:“imple-
mentation intentions eliminated the cognitive advantage of the
habitual means in the ‘horse race’ with the alternative response”
[(112), p. 503]. This gives the agent’s self-control system a much
better chance of winning the larger “horse race” with the incentive
salience system for the control of behavior.
We should thus predict that forming implementation inten-
tions should help agents to overcome incentive salience tempta-
tion; and the available data support this prediction. With regards to
non-addicted subjects, many studies have shown implementation
intentions to significantly improve success in dieting, an activity
that requires overcoming incentive salience desires for unhealthy
foods (126–128). Regarding the effectiveness of implementation
intentions in overcoming addiction, there is an unfortunate dearth
of research. However, one study has found that forming imple-
mentation intentions helped adolescents to quit smoking, though
only for those who had a “weak or moderate” smoking habit as
measured by a standard scale (125).
It is important to note that since implementation intentions aid
specifically with implemental self-control, they will only facilitate
self-control success among subjects who have already succeeded in
overcoming their incentive salience desires in both the deliberative
and volitional stages of self-control. If self-control fails in either of
these prior stages, then the deck will be stacked too heavily in favor
of the incentive salience system for a purely implemental interven-
tion such as forming implementation intentions to make much of a
difference. Perhaps this is why implementation intentions on their
own did not affect the most addicted subjects’ success at quitting
smoking.
More generally, since success at all three stages of self-control
is required for an agent to fully overcome incentive salience temp-
tation, the most effective interventions to aid self-control will
involve a combination of the stage-selective interventions we have
advocated here. One existing intervention that follows this pre-
scription is Gollwitzer and Oettingen’s “Mental Contrasting with
Implementation Intentions (MCII) ” method, in which subjects
first undergo the mental contrasting procedure – thus facilitating
volitional self-control – and then form implementation inten-
tions – thus improving implemental self-control. It should be
no surprise that the MCII method is highly effective in aiding
subjects to achieve their goals (117, 129–132). We can specu-
late that combining mindfulness training with the MCII method
would augment self-control even further, comprising a “triple
threat” of interventions that improve self-control in the delib-
erative, volitional, and implemental stages. Whether or not this
“MMMCII” method (Mindfulness Meditation, Mental Contrast-
ing, and Implementation Intentions) would in fact be effective
in overcoming both addictive and non-addictive temptation is a
question for further empirical work.
CONCLUSION
Intentional action is the product of a competition between at
least three different motivators, incentive salience desires, cog-
nitive desires, and habits, which is mediated by the self-control
system. As we argued in “Desire,” the incentive salience system is
not only the source of addictive desires, but is the source of many of
our ordinary, non-addictive desires as well. Due to the associative
manner in which they are formed, these incentive salience desires
are stubbornly independent of an agent’s reflective judgments
about what is valuable. This gives rise to the problem of self-
control: the challenge of resisting one’s incentive salience desires
when they do not align with one’s cognitive desires. We argued
in “The Existence of Self-Control” that the capacity to exert self-
control plays an independent role in determining behavior over
and above the relative strengths of an agent’s desires. This fact is
illustrated most vividly by cases where the capacity to exert self-
control is impaired (as in ego depletion) or lost altogether (as in
vmPFC lesioning). The empirical evidence thus lends significant
credence to the Platonic idea that there are two parts of the soul,
one rational and the other appetitive, that compete for control
over action.
As we argued in “Three Stages of Self-Control,” this compe-
tition proceeds in stages. We distinguished three of these stages:
deliberative, volitional, and implemental. In the deliberative stage,
an agent forms a judgment as to what course of action would
be best. Since the judgment the agent reaches depends upon the
considerations she attends to when deliberating about what to
do, deliberative self-control is a matter of directing attention in
order to resist the biasing pull of craving. In the volitional stage,
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an agent forms an intention to act in accordance with her deliber-
ative judgment. What this amounts to is the activation of a goal,
a mental state that guides behavior toward the achievement of a
certain end. Since incentive salience desires automatically activate
goals regardless of whether the agent judges them good, an agent
must exert self-control in order to make her goals accord with her
evaluative judgments. Finally, in the implemental stage, an agent
must guide her behavior in pursuit of her chosen goal. Whether
she succeeds in doing so depends upon her habits – the automatic
associations between contexts and behaviors she has formed in
the past. Since habits guide behavior independently from goals,
the regulation of habits – both by overcoming bad habits and
by forming good ones – is a third task of self-control, separate
from the two preceding. An agent must succeed in all three of
these stages of self-control in order to conform her actions to her
cognitive desires.
This single model captures the predicaments of the addict and
non-addict alike. The incentive salience desires that render the
addict’s actions so wildly out of sync with her values are present
in non-addicts as well, though in less extreme form. And thus the
non-addict will also sometimes act in ways she does not endorse,
driven by desires that motivate independently of her conception
of the good. The non-addict can resist these desires by exerting
self-control; but the addict can do this too. The task of self-control
is far more difficult for the addict – which is why it is often unrea-
sonable to blame addicts for giving in to temptation even when we
might blame a non-addict for doing so. But self-control is possible
for addicts, especially with strong incentives and assistance from
others. Indeed, this is just what recovery from addiction is: the
addictive desire does not go away, but the recovering addict learns
to control her behavior in spite of it.
Thus addicts are not so different from the rest of us as we
may have thought. But that may be because we underestimated
our own similarity to addicts, rather than the other way around.
There is a tendency to think of human agency as an entirely ratio-
nal affair: we simply do whatever we think is most likely to get
us what we want. The heuristics and biases literature has under-
mined this picture somewhat over the past few decades, but only
by showing us how we are not always rational in selecting the
means to our ends (133, 134). The model we have defended here
shows that the irrationality – or arationality – of human agency
goes a step deeper: our ends themselves can be set by desires that
are utterly divorced from what we take to be rationally desirable.
The activity of controlling our actions is thus not merely a mat-
ter of figuring out what we ought to do; it is a matter of fighting
to control our minds and actions in accordance with our rea-
sons. To borrow Plato’s metaphor, being a human agent is more
like struggling with stubborn horses for control over a chariot
than it is like calculating a utility function. Those of us who are
lucky enough not to suffer from addiction might come to under-
stand ourselves better by acknowledging that there is an addict
in us all.29
29For helpful comments and criticism, we thank Serge Ahmed, Dylan Bianchi,
Bennett Foddy, Matthias Jenny, Hanna Pickard, Bernhard Salow, Ian Wells, and
the participants at the Mechanisms of Self-Control Workshop at King’s College
London.
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